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Abstract 
The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, 
Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative 
program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were 
not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning 
purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge 
ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. 
Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger 
sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = 204). The analysis found a 
significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted 
direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case 
than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes 
into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find 
any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among 
the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but 
rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of 
sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of 
gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but 
is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of 
reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios 
discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries. 
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In their paper, which is believed to be one of the works that initiated 
experimental philosophy as a movement, Weinberg et al. (2001; hereafter: WNS) 
argue that the usage of thought experiments in epistemology is unreliable. They 
justify this claim by pointing out that we rely on our epistemic intuitions when 
evaluating thought experiments; however, as shown by their studies, these 
intuitions vary across various demographic variables (e.g. cultural background). 
However, there remains one effect reported by WNS which has not yet 
been replicated. The issue concerns the differences between South Asians 
(Indians) and Westerners (represented by Americans in their study) elicited by 
the Zebra Case (Dretske 1970). 
The methodology and assumptions of Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s 
studies have been widely criticized (Ludwig 2007; Kaupinnen 2007; 
Cullen 2010; Cappelen 2012; Woolfolk 2013; Deutsch 2010, 2015). However, 
leaving the metaphilosophical aspects of these studies aside, they opened the 
dispute on the (in)stability of epistemic intuitions. Since WNS’s study, there 
have been plenty of other studies regarding cultural differences in epistemic 
intuitions elicited by Gettier-style scenarios (e.g. Machery et al. 2017a; Machery 
et al. 2017b) and the possible influence of various factors on epistemic intuitions, 
e.g. age (Colaço et al. 2014), gender (Buckwalter and Stich 2014) or personality 
(Machery 2017). There have also been several attempts to corroborate WNS’s 
results (Nagel et al. 2013; Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim and Yuan 2015). None of 
these succeeded, which means that there are no confirmed cultural differences 
in epistemic intuitions in almost all2 the cases studied by WNS. In this paper, we 
present evidence of cultural differences between Indians and Westerners in 
intuitions elicited by Dretske’s Zebra Case. We also attempt to explain the effect 
we observed. Our explanation rests on the observation that the Zebra scenario 
is different from classic Gettier cases, since the former concerns skeptical 
pressure regarding perception, while the latter do not. We present some 
sociological and anthropological observations regarding the presence and 
importance of skepticism in Western culture, and the smaller importance and 
influence of skepticism regarding perception in Indian culture. An effort to 
confirm WNS’s results regarding the differences between Indians’ and 
Westerners’ intuitions elicited by the Zebra Case fits in recent projects which aim 
to corroborate findings from classic studies in experimental philosophy. The 
problems with corroboration of various empirical projects have recently been 
increasingly raised. For this reason, the need for replications of results from 
experimental philosophy is frequently brought up (for the literature on the 
                                                     
2 Seyedsayamdost failed to show differences between East Asians and Westerners in 
epistemic intuitions elicited by Truetemp Cases (inspired by Lehrer  1990), the Gettier 
Car Case (inspired by Gettier 1963), the Conspiracy Case (WNS’s own case), and the 
Zebra Case. Seyedsayamdost also failed to show differences between South Asians 
(Indians) and Westerners in epistemic intuitions elicited by Truetemp Cases, the Getter 
Car Case, and the Conspiracy Case. 
replication crisis in sciences other than experimental philosophy see e.g.: 
Ioannidis 2005; Chang and Li 2015; Open Science Collaboration 2015; 
Baker 2016; Miłkowski et al. 2018; for attempts to corroborate some classic X-Phi 
results see e.g.: Rose et al. 2017; Machery et al. 2020; van Dongen et al. 2020; 
Ziółkowski 2021; Cova et al. 2021; for methodological considerations concerning 
replication studies see Machery, 2020). The first large-scale replication project in 
experimental philosophy carried out by Cova et al. (2021) reran 40 X-Phi studies 
and, interestingly, the researchers found that demographic (including cross-
cultural) effects were less likely to be corroborated than content-based effects 
(i.e. effects that result from manipulating the contents of the experimental 
materials). Our study can be seen as a contribution to the replicability project in 
experimental philosophy. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the 
methodological critique formulated against WNS’s studies and show the 
reasons to expect differences between Indians and Westerners in intuitions 
regarding the Zebra Case. In Sect. 3, we describe our empirical protocol and 
methods, and we report our findings. In Sect. 4, we provide some arguments for 
the claim that the Zebra Case differs from paradigmatic Gettier cases in terms of 
its connection to skeptical pressure. In Sect. 5, we examine the presence and 
influence of skepticism in Western and Indian cultures. Section 6 is devoted to 
the range of possible metaphilosophical consequences of our findings. Finally, 
in Sect. 7, we draw final conclusions from our research. 
 
2. Reasons to expect cross-cultural differences in epistemic 
intuitions 
In his recent meta-analysis of experimental philosophy’s empirical findings 
(2017: 54), Machery claims that Seyedsayamdost failed to confirm all the 
results WNS reported. Nevertheless, Seyedsayamdost himself explicitly 
reports that in the Zebra Case (for the precise formulation of the scenario, 
see Sect. 3.1), the data collected by him was insufficient to draw any 
conclusions about the purported differences between Indians and 
Americans (see the footnote in Seyedsayamdost 2015: 105). Therefore, 
Seyedsayamdost’s failure to detect cross-cultural differences concerns all 
but one of the results of WNS: the differences between Indians and 
Westerners in epistemic intuitions elicited by the Zebra Case. 
WNS’s paper is one of the most influential articles in the field of 
experimental philosophy; however, it was criticized for its very small 
sample sizes and unrepresentative samples (the groups of Indians and East 
Asians were students living in the USA who self-identified as Indians or East 
Asians). Seyedsayamdost (2015), Nagel et al. (2013) and Kim and Yuan 
(2015) argued for replication because of these important methodological 
shortcomings of the original study. Importantly, all the attempts to 
corroborate WNS’s results mentioned above were unsuccessful, while one 
of WNS’s experiments has not yet been properly replicated. We find these 
reasons sufficient to justify the importance of undertaking this replication of 
WNS's experiment regarding the Zebra Case. 
However, although all the past attempts to confirm WNS’s findings 
failed, there are reasons to expect differences between Indians and 
Westerners regarding the Zebra Case. These reasons come from another 
study concerning differences in sensitivity to skeptical pressure between 
participants from India, China and the USA (Waterman et al. 2018) (for our 
arguments that the Zebra Case is a skeptical pressure case, but not a typical 
Gettier case, see Sect. 4.). Waterman et al. presented participants with 
vignettes that were similar to the original Zebra Case. Unlike in the WNS’s 
experiments, the participants were asked to agree or disagree with a 
knowledge ascription to the protagonist on a 6-point Likert scale. One of 
Waterman et al.’s studies included two conditions: in one condition, the 
vignette was constructed in such a way that the possibility of error was 
increased; however, in the second condition it was not. For example, below 
are two versions of the vignette used by Waterman et al. which is the closest 
counterpart of the original Zebra Case: 
 
Zoo Case, Normal Version: John and his friend go to the zoo. 
As they walk around, they pause in front of an exhibit 
marked “Brazilian Jaguar Enclosure.” John and his friend 
read about jaguars from the sign, and look out and see a 
jaguar sleeping on the branch of a tree in the enclosure. 
 
Zoo Case, Skeptical Version: John and his friend go to the zoo. 
As they walk around, they pause in front of an exhibit 
marked “Brazilian Jaguar Enclosure.” John and his friend 
read about jaguars from the sign, and look out and see a 
jaguar sleeping on the branch of a tree in the enclosure. 
However, African leopards look very much like Brazilian 
jaguars, and the signs in the zoo have recently been 
replaced by an inexperienced crew of workers. If a zoo 
official had accidentally switched the signs on their 
exhibits, John wouldn’t have been able to tell the difference 
between the jaguar he did see and a leopard. (Waterman et 
al. 2018: 192-193) 
 
Waterman et al. found that American and Chinese participants were far 
more likely to give different knowledge ratings in the skeptical and normal 
version of the case presented above (and other similar cases) than Indians. 
It is especially important for us that the effect size for Americans was much 
bigger (d = 1.43) than for Indians (d = 0.6). While the vignettes used in the 
study were modeled after Dretske’s Zebra Case, these results could suggest 
that there might be differences between Indians’ and Americans’ epistemic 
intuitions in ascribing knowledge in the original scenario. 
The search for cultural differences is all the more important since 
much discussion on the reliability of epistemological methodology concerns 
the variability or stability of epistemic intuitions across cultures (for a 
systematic review of empirical literature which suggests that philosophical 
intuitions vary across cultures, see Machery et al. 2021; for opposite 
arguments, see Knobe 2019, forthcoming). 
In summary, there is a need to fill the gap in the literature concerning 
replications of WNS’s experiments by conducting a study regarding the 
differences between Indians and Westerners in the case of Dretske’s Zebra 
Case. Moreover, the results presented by Waterman et al. seem to suggest 
that, in contrast to other effects reported by WNS, there are reasons to expect 
differences between Indians and Westerners that are in line with WNS’s 
findings concerning the Zebra Case. In the next section, we discuss in detail 
our study, which aims to determine whether Westerners’ intuitions about 
the Zebra Case differ from Indians’. 
 
3. The Experiment 
3.1 Methods, Materials and Procedure 
Our aim was to carry out a high-powered, pre-registered study that would 
mitigate the shortcomings of WNS’s original experiment. Every important 
methodological aspect of the study was registered in advance (the pre-
registration form can be found on the Open Science Framework 
webpage: https://osf.io/sypqg/). 
Since WNS adopted a questionable method of identifying the ethnicity 
of their subjects, we employed a more sophisticated procedure based on that 
used by Seyedsayamdost (2015) in his replications of WNS’s other experiments. 
The sample of Indians consisted of subjects who were located in India and self-
identified as Indians; we excluded those who were not born on the Indian 
Subcontinent or had more than one grandparent or parent who was not born 
there. The group of Westerners consisted of subjects who resided in the USA and 
self-identified as “White/Caucasian”; we excluded those who (a) specified that 
their primary region was Eastern Europe or Middle East, (b) were born outside 
Western Europe or North America, or (c) had more than one grandparent or 
parent who was born outside Western Europe or North America.3  
The study was conducted online and designed with LimeSurvey (an 
open-source application for managing online surveys: www.limesurvey.org); 
the participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk. The survey language was 
English (similarly to the WNS’s study and the replications carried out by 
Seyedsayamdost 2015). The first part of the survey contained the demographic 
questions: participants were asked about their age, gender, country of residence, 
country of origin, their native languages (each participant could specify more 
than one), and the places of birth of their parents and grandparents. Then, every 
                                                     
3 We are aware that including only people who reside in the USA in the group of 
Westerners might be controversial; however, it is in line with the methodology adopted 
by WNS. 
respondent was presented with the Zebra Case (phrased exactly as in the 
original study by WNS) and asked the target question: Does Mike really know that 
the animal is a zebra, or does he only believe that it is? As in the original study, the 
answer format was binary: the participants were offered a choice between 
“Really knows” (knowledge attribution) and “Only believes” (knowledge 
denial). Here is the exact formulation of the vignette: 
 
Mike is a young man visiting the zoo with his son, and when 
they come to the zebra cage, Mike points to the animal and 
says, "that's a zebra." Mike is right – it is a zebra. However, as 
the older people in his community know, there are lots of ways 
that people can be tricked into believing things that aren't true. 
Indeed, the older people in the community know that it's 
possible that zoo authorities could cleverly disguise mules to 
look just like zebras, and people viewing the animals would 
not be able to tell the difference. If the animal that Mike called 
a zebra had really been such a cleverly painted mule, Mike still 
would have thought that it was a zebra. Does Mike really 
know that the animal is a zebra, or does he only believe that it 
is? 
 
In order to ensure high data quality, we employed a demanding 
attention check that was presented at the very end of the survey. Each subject 
was presented with the following text: 
In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain facts 
about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you take time to read 
directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be 
invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please 
ignore the next question (i.e., don’t answer it), and simply write “I have read the 
instructions” in the box labeled “Please enter your comment here”. Thank you 
very much. 
Subjects could either answer the question Have you attended 
university? [yes/no] or leave the question unanswered and type “I have read the 
instructions” in the provided text field. Only those participants that provided 
the correct phrase in the text field were included in the final data analysis.In our 
pre-registration, we assumed we would need to achieve 90% power to detect a 
difference between ethnic groups of 15 percentage points in the proportions of 
knowledge attributions (one-tailed z-test).4 This means we needed at least 185 
valid responses (i.e. not excluded by our demographic criteria or the attention 
check) in each demographic group. 
 
                                                     
4 For calculations, we assumed the difference between proportions that requires the 
largest number of participants to be detected (50% vs. 65% or 35%).  
3.2 Participants 
All subjects were recruited via Amazon MTurk and received a small financial 
compensation for their participation in the study. For each sample, we set a 
different location request: all of the participants in the Indian sample had to be 
located in India, while for the sample of Westerners the location had to be the 
USA. The initial sample size was N = 729 (379 respondents from the USA and 
350 subjects from India), but a significant number of participants were excluded 
by our strict demographic criteria and the attention check (for details, see the 
section above), which yielded a final sample size of N = 415 (204 Indians and 211 
Westerners). Therefore, our sample size was sufficient to achieve the level of 
statistical power we assumed in the pre-registration. The average age of the 
respondents was 36.88 years (SD = 12.53); 36.4% were female (63.4% declared as 
male and one participant chose the ‘other’ option). 
3.3 Results 
We performed a simple z-test (one-tailed, due to the directional hypothesis we 
tested) on the data we collected in order to compare the proportion of 
knowledge attributions in the group of Indians and Westerners. The analysis 
found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question: the Indians 
were more likely to ascribe knowledge in the Zebra Case (55.9% of positive 
judgments) than the Westerners (only 41.7% of positive 
judgments): z = 2.89; p = 0.002; Φ = 0.14. Thus, our data did confirm the 
hypothesis regarding differences in Zebra Case intuitions between Westerners 
and subjects originating from the Indian Subcontinent, and the effect we found 
fits the predicted direction (the dataset can be accessed online via Open Science 
Framework webpage: https://osf.io/d9eg6/). The main analysis includes Indian 
subjects who fit our demographic criteria and passed the attention check but did 
not report English as their native language (n = 76). However, in the remaining 
sample of Indians who are native English speakers (n = 128), the proportion of 
knowledge attributions is similar as in the whole sample (61.7%), so the cross-
cultural effect persists and is even slightly more pronounced 
(z = 3.57; p < 0.001; Φ = 0.19). This provides further evidence to believe that the 
effect we observed is robust. The figure below illustrates our results and 
compares them to the results reported by the authors of the original WNS’s 
study (Fig. 1). 
  
 
Figure 1. The proportion of knowledge attributions and knowledge denials elicited by 
the Zebra Case among Westerners and Indians; the original WNS’s study (N = 86) vs. 
our Replication (N = 415). 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the size of the effect we observed is not 
very large (Φ = 0.14) and that the judgments provided by the participants in each 
group are highly divergent (close to a 50/50 distribution). One cannot say that 
positive or negative knowledge ratings strongly predominated in either of the 
ethnic groups we investigated. 
 
4. What kind of case is the Zebra Case? 
Researchers have put much effort into finding cross-cultural variation (or 
uniformity) in intuitions regarding Gettier cases as they are purported 
counterexamples to the classic theory of knowledge (i.e. cases of justified true 
belief that should not be classified as knowledge), therefore they are extremely 
important for epistemology. Before we proceed with our explanation of the data 
we collected, we would like to stress that the Zebra Case, although it involves 
intuitions about knowledge, is very different from regular Gettier cases (we will 
even suggest that it is not a Gettier case at all). 
In order to show that the Zebra Case does not have the typical traits of 
Gettier cases, we will use the framework offered by Blouw et al. (2017), which 
aims to provide a taxonomy of Gettier-style cases. It tracks differences between 
scenarios along three dimensions: Detection, Threat, and Replacement. Detection 
concerns whether or not an agent initially succeeds or fails to detect the truth 
value of the believed proposition; it is useful in drawing a distinction between 
so-called false lemma cases (where an agent arrives at a true conclusion on the 
basis of valid reasoning from at least one false premise, which was the main idea 
behind Gettier’s original scenarios) and more sophisticated cases that do not 
involve reasoning from false premises (such as the Fake Barns scenario, see 
Goldman 1976). Clearly, the Zebra Case is not a false lemma case, which makes 
it much different from the original Gettier cases. Threat tracks the presence of 
epistemic misfortune and luck: one can form a true belief that might be, but is 
not, disrupted by misfortune (threat is unsuccessful), or a true belief whose truth-
making relation ends up being disrupted by a stroke of bad luck (threat 
is successful). For example, if the protagonist in the Zebra Case was looking at 
the only real zebra in a flock of cleverly painted mules, then it would be a case 
of unsuccessful threat (the protagonist might have looked at a mule and formed 
a false belief, but the protagonist was lucky to have looked at the real zebra). 
However, such a threat is not present in the situation described in the Zebra Case 
we tested because the possibility of disguising mules as zebras is only 
mentioned in the story and is very remote for the subject in question. Replacement 
concerns cases in which Threat is successful, but thanks to another stroke of 
(good) luck the truthmaker of the belief in question is replaced in the process: 
the replacement might be very similar or quite dissimilar to the original 
truthmaker. Since there is no threat in the Zebra Case, there is no replacement 
either. It seems then that the Zebra Case does not possess any features that are 
crucial for it to be classified as a Gettier case. 
We believe that all the dimensions listed by Blouw et al. (2017) are in fact 
different instances of epistemic luck, which is often said to play an important 
role in Gettier cases. We do not want to go into detail here, so, to put it briefly, 
epistemic luck occurs when highly unlikely events or circumstances affect the 
truth value of a belief B held by a certain agent A; e.g. a stroke of good 
luck L makes B true, but if L had not occurred (which might have easily 
happened), B would be false and A would still believe B. (for more precise 
attempts at defining epistemic luck see, for example, Pritchard 2004). In false 
lemma cases, agents are lucky to draw a true conclusion from false premises 
(they might have easily drawn a false conclusion instead); in unsuccessful threat 
cases, they are lucky that the epistemic threat does not succeed in making their 
crucial belief false; in replacement scenarios, there is a double stroke of luck: 
first, the truthmaker of the belief in question is removed (bad luck), but then it 
is sufficiently replaced so that the belief is still true (good luck). Again, in the 
Zebra Case we cannot find any presence of a similar sort of epistemic luck; bad 
luck is only mentioned as a far-fetched possibility. 
So, what kind of case is the Zebra Case? We believe that the appropriate 
category here is skeptical pressure cases (for other examples of such vignettes, 
see Nagel et al., 2013). In these cases, the protagonist's belief is not true as a result 
of luck, but the reader is reminded of the possibility that the protagonist could 
be mistaken, even if that possibility is tiny or non-existent. In Gettier-style cases, 
where epistemic luck disrupts knowledge acquisition, a highly improbable 
stroke of good epistemic luck makes a certain belief true which would otherwise 
be false (thus, the belief is true by luck). In skeptical pressure cases the situation 
is, in a way, reverse: such stories only mention the remote possibility of an 
improbable stroke of bad epistemic luck that would make the belief in question 
false, if it had occurred; but since luck is not actually present, the belief is true 
not thanks to luck but due to reliable knowledge acquisition mechanisms. 
The standard way of reminding the reader about such a possibility is to 
stress that the protagonist could be wrong since they cannot be certain that their 
belief is not false. For instance, in the Zebra Case it is explicitly stated that if the 
animal that Mike called a zebra had really been such a cleverly painted mule, Mike still 
would have thought that it was a zebra. Therefore, although Mike could believe that 
the animal in front of him is a zebra, he could be wrong since that animal could 
be a mule. Such a strategy of exerting skeptical pressure is based on the 
epistemic closure principle, which states that if S knows that p and S knows 
that p entails q, then S knows that q. Let us use this principle on the Zebra Case. 
According to this principle, if Mike knows that the animal he is seeing is a zebra, 
and he knows that if that animal is a zebra then it is not a mule, then Mike knows 
that the animal he is seeing is not a mule. However, in the Zebra Case we are 
reminded that Mike cannot be certain whether the animal he is seeing is not a 
mule. Therefore, by modus tollendo tollens, which states that, if p entails q and q is 
false, then p is false, one could argue that Mike does not know that the animal 
he is seeing is a Zebra. 
According to Dretske, one could argue that Mike does not know that the 
animal in front of him is a zebra only if one accepts the epistemic closure 
principle. Subsequently, one should agree that just the possibility – even if it is 
not actually present – of being misguided about the logical consequences of a 
given belief could be a reason to assume that a given belief is not knowledge. 
Note that such an argument is nothing more or less than an explication of the 
classic skeptical doubt, according to which just the possibility of a mistake 
undermines knowledge. Importantly, this is the case only in skeptical pressure 
cases but not in standard Gettier cases. As was previously mentioned, in Gettier 
cases the possibility of error is actually present (see Vogel 1990; 
Hawthorne 2004; Nagel et al. 2013). 
However, a case was used in both WNS’s and Seyedsaysmdost’s studies 
which is not a classic Gettier case but also differs from the Zebra Case (and 
thereby from classic skeptical pressure cases). This case is the Conspiracy Case, 
in which the protagonist is aware of evidence according to which using nicotine 
without smoking does not increase the risk of getting cancer; however, the 
protagonist is also aware that the evidence could have been made up by the 
tobacco industry in order to increase tobacco companies’ income. 
There are at least three important differences between the Zebra Case 
and the Conspiracy Case. Firstly, the Conspiracy Case concerns testimonial 
knowledge, while the Zebra Case concerns perceptual knowledge. Secondly, in 
the Zebra Case the possibility of a mistake is much more related to classic 
skeptical doubts, i.e. doubts concerning the reliability of our perception; on the 
other hand, in the Conspiracy Case the doubts concern the reliability of scientific 
evidence and the impact of lobby groups on information provided to the public. 
Thirdly, note that the possibility that zoo authorities are disguising zebras in 
order to misguide zoo visitors is much stranger than the possibility that tobacco 
companies made up and publicized evidence that using nicotine does not 
increase the likelihood of cancer in order to increase their income. 
Therefore, we claim that the major difference between the Zebra Case 
and other cases studied by WNS and Seyedsayamost is that doubts about 
whether the protagonist knows that p in the Zebra Case results from skeptical 
pressure regarding perception, while in the other cases it could follow from 
other reasons, such as luck in being correct about p or other features discussed 
above. This is a reason to assume that intuitions elicited only by the Zebra Case 
(among these studied by WNS) are related to its similarity to standard skeptical 
arguments or, more generally, to standard skeptical tropes. 
 
5. Indian culture is less skeptical than Western culture 
Our explanation of the results relies on the observed difference between the 
influence of skeptical tropes in Western and Indian cultures. We claim that while 
skepticism has a huge and important influence on both Western philosophy and 
culture, in Indian culture its presence is much smaller. Moreover, realist rather 
than skeptical tropes are widely present in Indian philosophy. 
In the following sections, we present some evidence in favor of such claims. In 
Sect. 5.1 we discuss the presence of skeptical thought throughout the whole 
history of Western philosophy, and the manifestation of skeptical tropes in 
popular culture. Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the whole 
history of skepticism in Western philosophy but to demonstrate that in every 
stage of the evolution of Western thought, skepticism has played an important 
role. In Sect. 5.2 we discuss the body of evidence showing that skepticism 
regarding perception has played a much less important role in India than in the 
West. 
Therefore, we believe that the more vivid presence of skeptical tropes regarding 
perception in Western than in Indian culture could explain our results. What 
differentiates the intuitions elicited by skeptical pressure cases from those 
elicited by traditional Gettier-style cases is essentially the subjects’ willingness 
to question the general reliability of a given mechanism of knowledge formation 
(be it testimony, analogy, or perception), not its applicability in superficially 
unfortunate circumstances (as in original Gettier or Fake Barn cases). The 
exposure to the arguments and tropes which question the reliability of 
perception may be therefore crucial in explaining our subjects’ willingness to 
deny ascribing knowledge to the protagonist of our scenario. 
5.1 Skepticism in Western culture 
Skepticism has been present and influential in the whole history of Western 
philosophy. In Ancient Greece, the best-known representatives of skepticism 
are, of course, representatives of the skeptic school, who argue that since we 
have no reasons to think that we can know anything for sure, we should 
practice epoche: in other words, we try to suspend all judgments.5  
                                                     
5 One could argue that the answer options given to the participants in our study (‘only 
believes’ or ‘really knows’) do not include the Pyrrhonian option,  i.e. the attitude to 
“suspend all judgments”. Unfortunately, offering a third, Pyrrhonian option to the 
respondents would be a serious methodological deviation from the original study 
which we wanted to replicate as closely as possible. Moreover, although the option 
However, although Pyrrho and the skeptical school he established are 
usually considered the beginning of skeptical thought in Western philosophy, 
there had already been some skeptical threads before then. According to Lesher 
(1978), Xenophanes could be seen as the first regular skeptic among Western 
thinkers, since he insisted that “no human being knows; for even if by chance he 
should hit upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but imagines and 
opines” (Lesher 1978: 1). Although – according to a more recent interpretation 
of Xenophanes – this phrase should not be interpreted as an expression of global 
skepticism, it at least expresses skepticism towards direct perception 
(Lesher 2019). As well as those in the works of Xenophanes, some skeptical 
tropes also appear in the thought of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Democritus 
(Lee 2001). 
An example of an extremely influential skeptical trope in ancient Greece after 
Pyrrho is Plato’s Cave (Republic: 514a–520a); this very famous philosophical 
thought experiment concerns the possibility of being misled by perception. This 
skeptical trope is important for all of Plato’s epistemology, according to which 
our knowledge does not stem from perceiving things but rather from 
recollecting truths about ideas by anamnesis. 
Skepticism did not disappear after the end of the ancient era; it was still 
influential in the middle ages: both as a defended view which aimed to contrast 
the limitations of human knowledge with God's omniscience (such a view was 
defended by, e.g., Lactatius (2007), and John of Salisbury (see: Lagerlund 2010: 
10)); and as a criticized view (one of the most important critics of skepticism was 
Augustine of Hippo, who argued for unquestionable content of mind and for 
the theory of illumination, which aimed to provide infallible ground for 
knowledge (Augustine: Contra Academicos)). 
While skeptical tropes in the middle ages appeared mainly as a result of 
criticism of skepticism, it is undoubtedly true that Cartesian skepticism should 
be seen as modern philosophy’s foundational thought. The Cartesian skeptical 
arguments presented in his Meditations (Descartes 1641 [1931]) regarding the 
possibility of being permanently deceived about the existence of the external 
world involve the aforementioned closure principle (see DeRose and 
Warfield 1999). Let us remember that the Zebra Case was presented in Dretske’s 
article in order to discuss this principle. While this issue, which concerns the 
Zebra Case and which is supposed to be intuitive, has its roots in the thought of 
one of the most famous, well known and influential European philosophers, it 
seems to be unsurprising that people familiar with Cartesian doubts would be 
very susceptible to skeptical pressure. 
Enough about the history of philosophy, and let us not discuss examples 
of skeptical tropes in contemporary philosophy in detail (the most obvious 
                                                     
‘only believes’ does not perfectly reflect the suspension of judgment, we believe that, 
lacking other appropriate answer options, the respondents who would like to express 
their Pyrrhonian attitude would still choose ‘only believes’ rather than ‘really knows’ 
(since the latter carries definitely more epistemic weight than the former, to put it 
figuratively). We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer (this journal) for drawing our 
attention to this issue. 
examples of influential works that argue for or against some sorts of skepticism 
are Ayer 1940; Moore 1939; Wittgenstein 1969; Putnam 1981). Note that in 
Western (pop)culture, skeptical themes appear quite often. The 
Matrix5 or Inception are notable examples of movies that discuss the skeptical 
hypothesis concerning the existence of the external world. Moreover, both these 
movies not only discuss the possibility that the external world does not exist. In 
both of them, this possibility turns out to be partly true. Note that these movies 
do not aim to be pop-science products for educational purposes. These are 
mainstream, award-winning, popular movies. Therefore it seems plausible that 
the philosophical ideas raised by these movies were already widely known, or 
at least became known after the peak of these movies’ popularity. 
These movies are not exceptions. In addition to The Matrix6 and Inception, 
there are plenty of other examples of books or movies that contain skeptical 
tropes, such as The Truman Show, Simulacron-3, The Thirteenth Floor7, Solaris8 or 
Midnight in Paris. 
In sum, skeptical thought, especially regarding the (un)reliability of 
perceptual knowledge, has been present and influential throughout the whole 
history of Western philosophy. For modern philosophy, because of Cartesian 
skeptical arguments, skepticism took the leading role. Nowadays, there are 
plenty of examples of skeptical tropes not only in philosophy but also in popular 
culture. These insights are not new or surprising; however, what might be 
considered striking is the difference between the importance of skepticism in 
Western culture and in Indian culture. In the next section, we will discuss the 
role of skepticism in Indian culture and argue that its importance was rather 
small in contrast to Western culture. 
5.2 The lack of skepticism in Indian culture 
Although it is an impossible task to demonstrate the absence of certain skeptical 
tropes in Although it is an impossible task to demonstrate the absence of certain 
skeptical tropes in Indian culture, we believe that there exists a body of evidence 
showing that skepticism regarding perception is not as prominent in India as in 
the West. An interesting point may be raised by studying the history of Indian 
philosophical tradition and the presence of skeptical tropes regarding 
perception. In comparison to Western and other philosophical traditions, the 
lack of such tropes may amount to an explanation of the stronger prevalence of 
knowledge attributions in the Zebra Case among Indian subjects. 
In his assessment of the history of skepticism in Indian philosophy, 
Dipankar Chatterjee notes that “the Indian philosophical tradition lacks a 
thorough system of skepticism” (1977: 195), in the sense in which skepticism is 
understood as the position that there are no justifiable knowledge claims (1977: 
195–196). This understanding is, of course, very narrow and probably can only 
                                                     
6 For a more detailed discussion on the philosophical, and especially skeptical tropes 
in The Matrix see e.g. Chalmers 2005. 
7 Which was loosely based on the book Simulacron-3. 
8 Both the novel by Lem and the two movies based on it: one directed by Tarkovsky 
(1972) and one directed by Soderbergh (2002). 
be attributed to Pyrrhonian skeptics; significantly, however, most of the 
different skeptical tropes encountered in Indian philosophy do not include 
skepticism about perception. Nyāya, a central epistemological school of the 
classic period of Indian philosophy, takes perception (pratyakṣa) to be one of the 
four legitimate means of knowledge (pramāṇa), along with inference (anumāṇa), 
analogy (upamāṇa) and testimony (śabda). Although the last three have been 
contested as improper by various epistemological schools, even the Carvaka, a 
radical materialist school (probably most deserving of the term “skeptical”), 
famously held that sense-perception is the only proper way of knowing. A 
renewed interest in Classic Indian skepticism resulted in the interpretations of 
the 8–9th-century philosopher Jayarāśi (see Mills 2015; Balcerowicz 2020). These 
interpretations portray Jayarāśi as a radical skeptic who explicitly engages 
with Nyāya and Carvaka traditions9 and also denies pratyakṣa the status 
of pramāṇa. However, Jayarāśi’s conclusions seem to be widely criticized in 
classic Indian philosophy and are not seen as a major threat to philosophical 
analysis of perception. If we agree that the prevailing position in Indian 
philosophical analysis of perception was that of Nyāya’s “direct realism” 
(Matilal 1986: 223–224), then its contrast with the Western philosophical 
tradition – which has been troubled with questions of the reliability of sense-
perception since antiquity – becomes clearly visible. It is therefore possible that 
the cultures that gave birth to and were influenced by these considerations 
significantly differ in terms of their attitudes towards perceptual knowledge, 
which might explain the differences we observed. 
This observation does not generalize further onto other skeptical 
problems: although WNS claimed that South Asians are also more eager to 
ascribe knowledge in Gettier cases, the subsequent replication failed to confirm 
this result (Seyedsayamdost 2015). This is in line with the observation that 
general epistemological considerations concerning the definition of knowledge 
are deeply rooted in Indian philosophical tradition, with 12th-century 
philosopher Śrīharṣ a even formulating four cases that bear a striking 
resemblance to Gettier cases – as has been discussed by Nyāya philosophers 
(most notably Gaṅ geśa, see: Matilal 1986: 135–140, Ganeri 2018: 16–19). 
It is also noteworthy that both Weinberg et al. (2001) and Seyedsayamdost (2015) 
found no cross-cultural differences with regards to knowledge ascription in the 
Zebra Case among Westerners and East Asians (Chinese subjects). Interestingly, 
perception-related skeptical positions may be easily found in Chinese 
philosophy in the impactful texts of Laozi (see Cheng 1977) and Zhuangzi, who 
famously presented a “Butterfly Dream” argument bearing striking similarities 
with Descartes’s “Evil Demon” hypothesis. The influence of Buddhist 
skepticism on Chinese philosophical culture was significant (Guang 2013), 
                                                     
9 Buddhist philosophers Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu also seem to be notable 
exceptions to Chatterjee’s claim. However, their skeptical projects tend to acknowledge 
perception as a valid source of knowledge in at least some readings (as well as later 
developments in the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition following Dignaga), and 
they definitely focus more on Buddhist skepticism towards the notion of “the self” or 
“reality”. 
which may have also contributed to the overall presence of skepticism regarding 
perception. This observation further corroborates the hypothesized connection 
between the presence of certain philosophical ideas in culture and the 
philosophical intuitions shared by its living community. 
We believe that it is probable that certain philosophical positions and 
tropes (such as Western rationalist distrust of perception as a source of 
knowledge) simply did not influence the subjects who attributed knowledge to 
the protagonist in the Zebra Case in our study. It could also be the case that a 
deeper absence of skeptical considerations in religious or social traditions 
influenced both India’s philosophical landscape and modern culture. The 
absence of these motifs in Indian culture and education might explain the higher 
prevalence of intuitions supporting knowledge attribution among subjects from 
India, as opposed to their wider presence in Western and Chinese culture. This 
also parallels the size of our effect: a more visible and influential presence of 
skeptical intuitions regarding perception probably did not influence all 
Westerners or East Asians, while some Indians were still exposed to them. 
Therefore, the difference in knowledge attribution between Western and Indian 
culture is significant, but it is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. 
These considerations of course should come with a caveat: relying on 
philosophy as evidence for the lack of skeptical tropes in culture in order to 
substantiate the laypersons’ lack of skeptical intuitions should be approached 
carefully. We do not possess any evidence suggesting that a parallel lack of 
skeptical tropes occurs in pop-culture, education or science, apart from the lack 
of positive evidence suggesting otherwise. However, there are two points that 
may strengthen the treatment of philosophy as a pars pro toto in this case. Firstly, 
as noted in the above section, philosophy seems to be a primary source of many 
skeptical tropes in modern Western pop-culture. Although we did not find any 
thorough study of the presence of skeptical tropes in Indian pop-culture, we 
might expect that the lack of such tropes in philosophy should have at least a 
slight impact on their prevalence in broader culture. Secondly, the Classic Indian 
philosophy is rooted in India’s religious traditions with continuous practice of 
commentary on the Vedas. It would be surprising if the tropes present in religion 
were not discussed in detail by philosophers. We might therefore expect the lack 
(or a scarce presence) of skeptical tropes occurring in religious circumstances or 
being discussed in religious contexts. These contexts probably have a much 
greater impact on laypersons’ intuitions. That being said, we acknowledge that 
considerations offered in this section are speculative and are meant to open a 
discussion about the interpretation of this effect instead of offering an ultimate 
explanation. 
 
6. What these results do (not) show 
Does the size of the effect we observed allow us to draw any interesting 
philosophical conclusions? We believe that an answer to this question depends 
on one’s theoretical approach towards experimental philosophy and 
philosophical interests. We will discuss the significance of these results 
regarding three crucial theoretical enterprises: the negative project of 
experimental philosophy (as defended, e.g., in Weinberg et al. 2001 and Nichols 
et al. 2003); the descriptive approach in experimental epistemology; and in 
cultural anthropology. 
The original research project which inspired our study was Weinberg et 
al. (2001), which was actually one of the founding texts of the negative program 
in experimental philosophy; therefore, our result should be discussed in 
comparison with the theses advanced in this paradigm. In their report on their 
findings concerning the Zebra Case, WNS discuss this case in the following 
manner: 
 
“What's going on in these last two [Zebra and Conspiracy] 
cases? Why do Scs [people from the Indian subcontinent] and 
Ws [Westerners] have different epistemic intuitions about 
them? The answer, to be quite frank, is that we are not sure 
how to explain these results. But, of course, for our polemical 
purposes, an explanatory hypothesis is not really essential. 
The mere fact that Ws, Eas [East Asians], and SCs have 
different epistemic intuitions is enough to make it plausible 
that IDR [Intuition-Driven Romanticism] strategies which take 
these intuitions as inputs would yield significantly different 
normative pronouncements as output”. (Weinberg et al. 2001: 
445). 
 
In Nichols et al. (2003), the authors also link the existence of this effect to their 
broader skepticism about the universality of intuitions that are reflected in the 
study of knowledge attribution. They also discuss the results of WNS’s 
experiments concerning the Zebra Case and the Conspiracy Case (Nichols et 
al. 2003: 15), which involves similar skeptical pressure regarding testimonial 
evidence (see Weinberg, Nichols, Stich: 444). The proponents of the negative 
program therefore use this data to support the thesis that the intercultural 
differences in philosophical intuitions render the use of intuitions in 
epistemology unjustified. “[T]he lesson to be drawn from our cross-cultural 
studies is that, however obvious they may seem, these [skeptical] intuitions are 
simply not to be trusted” (Nichols et al. 2003: 17). 
However, even if IDR is a proper picture of an actual philosophical 
method (for arguments against that view see e.g. Williamson 2007; 
Deutsch 2010, 2015; Cappelen 2012), such explanations and conclusions would 
follow from our result only if we observed a kind of systematic difference in a 
variety of cases regarding knowledge attribution between subjects from 
different cultural backgrounds. In the light of negative replications of all WNS’s 
other findings regarding differences in knowledge attributions between 
Westerners and Indians/East Asians (including the purported difference in the 
Conspiracy Case; see Seyedsayamdost 2015), we should also be skeptical of 
drawing such major conclusions from our study. We believe that our proposed 
explanation, which limits itself to pointing out differences in approaches to 
determining the legitimacy of perception as a means of knowledge between 
Indian and Western cultures, is much more modest and captures the crucial 
difference between the Zebra Case and other cases studied by WNS and 
Seyedsayamdost (2015). Compared to the scarce evidence of similar worries 
regarding perception, the widespread presence of skepticism towards 
testimonial evidence and Gettier-style cases in Indian philosophy may nicely 
illustrate our point and explain the peculiar difference in knowledge attribution 
in the Zebra Case but not in others. The fact that the difference in intuitions 
between Indians and Westerners exclusively concerns the Zebra Case also 
cannot be accounted for by the original suggestion made by WNS, i.e. that 
cultural differences in epistemic intuitions may have their roots in the different 
“thinking styles” or “belief-forming strategies” of subjects from different 
cultures, as postulated by Nisbett et al. (2001).10  
It is also worth noting that the effect we observed, though robust and 
significant, is not overwhelming. The strongest claim that may be substantiated 
by our results is that the overall tendency among Western subjects to deny 
knowledge attribution in the Zebra Case does not prevail among subjects from 
the Indian subcontinent. Such a claim is not strong enough to substantiate the 
negative approach of WNS, but it is sufficiently interesting for cultural 
anthropologists and for epistemologists interested in the influence of culture on 
epistemic intuitions. If our explanation of the data is correct, then it may shed 
some light on anthropologically interesting differences between Western and 
Indian culture regarding the presence of certain ideas or tropes. 
Before drawing final conclusions, let us point out some limitations of the 
explanation of the cross-cultural effect that we found. The main aim of this paper 
is to investigate cross-cultural differences between Indians and Westerners in 
their intuitions elicited by the Zebra Case. We would like to stress that our 
explanation, which rests on observations regarding the skeptical tropes in 
Indian and Western cultures, should be seen as a suggestion – a plausible one, 
but still just a suggestion or an empirically testable hypothesis. Note that there 
are other possible explanations of our results – e.g. Indians could attribute 
knowledge in the Zebra Case less willingly than Westerners because Indians go 
to the Zoo less often but, on the other hand, see animals more often in the wild11; 
or because Indians are less familiar with mules and zebras than Westerners (or 
more familiar – we do not have any reasons to think that explanations just 
                                                     
10 Apart from the exclusivity of the Zebra Case among other scenarios, it is also doubtful 
whether such a “Nisbettian” explanation may at all account for the described difference 
in epistemic intuitions between subjects from India and the USA. The opposition 
between “holistic” and “analytic” thinking styles described by Nisbett et al. ( 2001) 
applied exclusively to the difference between Western and East Asian culture (which 
do not differ with respect to the number of subjects who ascribe knowledge to the 
protagonist in the Zebra Case, as shown in both Weinberg, Nichols, Stich 2001 and 
Seyedsayamdost 2015). It is also rather unclear why knowledge ascription in the Zebra 
Case should be regarded as more “holistic” than the “analytic” option.  
11 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for raising the possibility 
of alternative explanations of our results and for pointing out the limitations of our 
study. 
 
mentioned are plausible, however, they are possible). In order to rule out such 
alternative explanations, further studies should be conducted. We are aware of 
that fact, and therefore, as mentioned, we treat our explanation as a suggestion 
and as a plausible starting point for future studies on cross-cultural differences 
in epistemic intuitions between Indians and Westerners, which hopefully could 
either confirm or falsify our explanation. 
Since, as we argue, the crucial feature which is responsible for differences 
between Westerners and Indians in our study is the lack or presence of skeptical 
tropes in these cultures while the Zebra Case encourages skeptical pressure, we 
believe that the possible follow up studies which could help to confirm our 
explanation would focus on similar cross-cultural differences in other skeptical 
pressure cases (e.g. these used by Nagel et al. (2013) in their studies; we quote 
these scenarios in the Appendix). 
7. Conclusion 
We believe that the conclusion of this paper should be regarded as threefold. 
Firstly, it fills the gap in the literature regarding WNS’s studies of cross-cultural 
differences in the exhibition of skeptical intuitions. The Zebra Case stands out 
as the only experiment that has not been yet replicated, while the replications of 
other experiments performed by WNS that used more precise ethnic 
background criteria and tested more subjects than the original studies failed to 
corroborate WNS’s findings. Our experiment used the exact same scenario as 
WNS but more rigorous ethnic group inclusion criteria than the original study; 
also, it was performed on significantly more subjects than the original 
experiment. The result, contrary to replications of other WNS’s experiments, 
was positive: we observed a significant difference between subjects from the 
Indian subcontinent and Westerners in the expected direction, with 55.9% of the 
former and only 41.7% of the latter attributing knowledge to the protagonist in 
the Zebra Case. This result completes the task of replicating the findings of 
Weinberg et al. (2001). 
The above-mentioned result brings us to the second conclusion of this 
paper, which is the specificity of the Zebra Case among the other scenarios 
tested by WNS. Our results call for an explanation of why a cross-cultural 
difference in knowledge attribution was observed in the Zebra Case but not in 
others. By analyzing the properties shared by the Gettier scenarios, we 
determined that the Zebra Case should be regarded as concerning skeptical 
pressure, not epistemic luck (which concerns Gettier-style scenarios). 
Furthermore, by comparing it to the Conspiracy Case, which is similar, we 
singled out the crucial property of the Zebra Case, which is skeptical pressure 
concerning perceptual knowledge (unlike the Conspiracy Case, in which 
skeptical pressure applies to the reliability of testimony). Therefore, in light of 
all these observations, we argue that the difference between Indians and 
Westerners does not concern skeptical intuitions in general (as claimed by 
WNS); instead, it specifically concerns skeptical intuitions about the reliability 
of perception as a source of knowledge. 
The third conclusion we draw is the possible explanation of the 
difference we found. We believe that the fact that subjects from India are more 
eager to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners may be 
elucidated by the presence of skeptical tropes concerning perception in culture 
and education. We compared the corpus of classical Indian and Western 
philosophy and found a crucial difference in the presence of skeptical arguments 
concerning the reliability of perceptual knowledge. Classical Indian philosophy 
is much more reluctant to deny perception the status of a reliable source of 
knowledge (as evidenced by the dominant tradition of Nyaya and critical points 
raised by other thinkers) than classical and modern Western philosophers. We 
also believe that the overall use of skeptical tropes in (pop)culture is much more 
present in Western media and education than in India. The peculiarity of Indian 
tradition may also be compared with classical Chinese philosophy, where 
skeptical doubts concerning perception were more widespread, which might 
also explain why the difference in knowledge attribution between Westerners 
and East Asians in the Zebra Case was not observed (Seyedsayamdost 2015). 
We believe, therefore, that this study may close one chapter and open 
another. It concludes the nearly 20-year discussion concerning the robustness of 
the effects observed by Weinberg et al. (2001), but it also provides us with the 
prospect of benefits stemming from careful comparative study between 
different philosophical traditions. If our explanation of this effect is correct, then 
it is also possible that the general impact of philosophy on modern culture may 
run deep and vary across different cultures. In this sense, we believe it may 
inspire other empirical hypotheses concerning cross-cultural differences in 
philosophical intuitions. 
Appendix 
Skeptical pressure cases from Nagel et al. 201312: 
 
1. Albert is in a furniture store with his wife. He is looking at a bright red table 
in a display. The displays in the showroom have been set up by a decorator who 
has a real flair for design. The showroom features a mix of contemporary and 
modern pieces. Albert likes the way this table looks, and starts to think about 
buying it. He believes the table is just the shade of red he was looking for. 
However, a white table under red lighting would look exactly the same to him, 
and Albert has not checked whether the lighting in this store is currently normal, 
or whether there might be a red spotlight shining on this particular table. There 
is in fact normal lighting throughout the showroom. Albert asks his wife, “Do 
you like this red table?” 
 
2. Emma is shopping for jewelry. She goes into a nice-looking store, and spends 
some time looking at several different displays. She tells the salesperson that she 
is looking for a diamond necklace with a classic design. She always likes to try 
                                                     
12 We are grateful to the authors of this study for providing their research materials 
on request. 
things on before she makes up her mind about them, and the salesperson shows 
her several options. Emma selects a diamond pendant from a tray marked 
“Diamond Earrings and Pendants”. “What a lovely diamond!” she says as she 
tries it on. Emma could not tell the difference between a real diamond and a 
cubic zirconium fake just by looking or touching. 
 
3. Amanda has just arrived at Atlantic University as a spring term transfer 
student. She is looking forward to the change of attending a different institution 
for a semester, although she knows she will be missing her friends. Today she 
has to run some errands, including buying a new battery for her laptop 
computer. After that, Amanda realizes she also needs to get a library card. It’s a 
long walk from the computer store down to the library, but it is a nice day, and 
Amanda doesn’t mind the walk. When she gets to the library, Amanda goes to 
the front information desk to ask where to get a card. There is no one staffing 
the desk just then, so she asks a passing student instead. The student tells her 
that campus ID cards, which also work as library cards, are issued at a booth on 
the ground floor of the student activity centre. This is in fact true, although 
Amanda has no special information on whether this student is trustworthy or 
well-informed. In any event, Amanda thanks the student and heads over to the 
student activity centre. 
 
4. Wanda is out for a weekend afternoon walk near the train station and wonders 
what time it is. She glances up at the clock on the train station wall and sees that 
it says 4:15 pm. It is in fact 4:15 pm at that moment. The station clock is in fact 
working, but it has no second hand, and Wanda only looks at it for a moment, 
so she would not be able to tell if the clock were stopped. 
 
5. Luke works in an office with two other people, Victor and Monica. They all 
get along fairly well, chatting at the water cooler when work is slow. All winter 
Victor has been telling Luke about his plans to go to Las Vegas on his vacation, 
even showing Luke the website of the hotel where he has reservations. When 
Victor is away on vacation, Luke sees Victor’s Facebook photos of himself with 
Vegas landmarks in the background, together with status updates about how 
much he is enjoying his trip. Victor really did have a good time in Vegas, and 
was sad to go back home to Markham. When he gets back to work, Victor talks 
a lot to Luke about how much fun he had on vacation. The resolution on the 
Facebook photos was low, however; Luke could not tell the difference between 
real vacation pictures from Las Vegas and fakes created with Photoshop. 
 
6. Sarah is out with some friends, shopping for clothing at a large mall. She and 
her friends spend quite a bit of time hanging out at the mall trying things on and 
discussing fashion. As Sarah is standing at the entrance of her favorite store, she 
sees someone being chased by several security guards. “Oh my God!” she 
exclaims. “I recognize him. It’s Walter, this guy I worked with as a lifeguard last 
summer.” The guards catch up and put Walter into handcuffs right in front of 
Sarah and her friends. Sarah got a good look at Walter there, but would not have 
been able to tell him apart from his twin brother, if he had a twin brother (he 
doesn’t actually have one). 
 
7. Paul Jones was worried because it was 10 pm and his wife Mary was not home 
from work yet. Usually she is home by 6 pm. He tried her cell phone but he just 
kept getting her voicemail. Starting to worry that something might have 
happened to her, he decided to call around to local hospitals to ask whether any 
patient by the name of “Mary Jones” had been admitted that evening. The 
switchboard operator of the county hospital confirmed that someone by that 
name had been admitted with major but not life-threatening injuries following 
a car crash. Paul’s wife was in fact awaiting surgery in the hospital at that 
moment. Paul did not stop to wonder how reliable the switchboard operator 
would be, or whether she might be referring to another person with the same 
name as his wife. He just grabbed his coat and rushed out to the county hospital. 
 
8. Brad is driving up to his cousin’s cottage north of the city with some friends 
of his. It is late Friday afternoon, and it’s sunny and clear out. Brad and his 
friends are even enjoying the long drive. At one bend in the road Brad points at 
something on the side of the road. “Hey, look – it’s a baby deer!” Everyone in 
the car sees what Brad does, and agrees that there’s a very cute baby deer 
standing very still in the fenced field by the side of the road. The deer doesn’t 
move as they watch it. At this distance they would not have been able to tell if it 
had been just a realistic statue rather than a real deer, but it is in fact a real deer, 
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